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1. Introduction 
 
The Hungarian parliamentary arena has witnessed major political scandals in the last few 
years. Attempts at obstruction, the use of megaphones and whistles, the provocative banners 
have been part of the parliamentary arsenal but the conflict reached its climax in December, 
2018 when opposition MPs attempted to obstruct the parliamentary debate of the so-called 
Overtime Bill which would modify the Labour Code allowing for more overtime. First, the 
opposition MPs introduced almost 3000 amendments to the bill in order to prompt the 
postponement of the debate. However, the Speaker of the House requested a meeting of the 
Justice Committee of the Parliament which decided to hold a single vote on the proposed 
opposition amendment which were deemed unfit for negotiation. Upon the commotion in the 
opposition benches, the Speaker called the Parliamentary Guard to line up at the plenary 
prompting further discontent among opposition MPs many of whom left the parliamentary 
floor after questioning the legal basis of the decision. Later, opposition MPs unsuccessfully 
tried to hinder the final vote on the bill by blocking the Speaker’s access to its podium who 
then decided to preside over the session from his own seat.  
 
While chaos and obstruction have always been part of the parliamentary world (Bell, 2017), 
this event is exemplary because of the unique combo of parliamentary procedural rules 
applied form the decision of the Justice Committee of the Parliament to the line-up of the 
Parliamentary Guard. Time is a scarce resource in parliaments thus obstruction attempts are 
costly in more than one way and are to be avoided through the strict application of the 
procedural rules in which the right to debate and control are limited by stringent timeframes. 
However, in our case the opposition was overcome by the application of strong disciplinary 
powers including even an armed group, the Parliamentary Guard which was a first in the 
Hungarian Parliament. In my paper I will argue that this Hungarian case is not just a colourful 
anecdote about how parliamentary work can be similar to the dynamics of a sand box where 
toddlers try to talk each other down but rather a clear sign of change in the direction of 
institutional change in parliaments and ultimately in how government-opposition dynamics 
are framed in terms of discipline and behaviour instead of policy debate and political conflict. 
 
In the international literature there is increasing attention paid to parliamentary rules and 
institutional changes which is most clearly pronounced by Sieberer et al who directly suggest 
a new research agenda of mapping and explaining parliamentary rule changes. They argue 
that the reform of parliamentary rules affects the strategy of parliamentary actors, that 
studying the motivation behind the redesign of rules contributes to the understanding of how 
decision-makers interact with rules binding them and third, that the resulting longitudinal data 
is valuable resource for comparative research on parliaments (2016:61). Between the different 
approaches presented by the authors, I will apply a meso level approach that focuses on 
subsets of a reform based on the expected effect namely on the redistribution of power 
between the parliamentary majority and minority and the majority/minority friendliness of 
individual rule changes (2016:81). 
 
                                               
1 Paper presented at the Europeans Consortium Joint Sessions Workshop, Mons, 8-12, April, 2019.  
2 The research was founded by the Janos Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 2 
The focus on parliamentary rules raises further questions about the conceptualization of 
opposition as the concept in itself is highly political and not used in legal texts that rather talk 
about MPs and (qualified) minority. Thus, the first part of my paper will deal with some 
theoretical considerations about how to connect the legal concepts to the political realities and 
about which subset of parliamentary rules should be studied. The second section of my paper 
will be dedicated to the analysis of those subset of rules with the third section attempting to 
identify the changes in those rules. In the discussion I would like to present the research 
framework developed in the study as a tool for comparative research. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
 
What is parliamentary opposition? As Garritzmann notes we lack a theory of political 
opposition (2017:2) since the opposition is usually understood in a negative way as the non-
governing part of the parliament. However, as Andeweg (2013) has clearly demonstrated it is 
hardly a stable definition, since in certain political context, the opposition becomes blurred or 
following Dahl (1966) it loses its distinctiveness. It can happen when opposition parties 
support the government or when governing parties oppose the government or when opposition 
parties provide structural support to a minority government and even when the government 
anticipates an opposition majority in another institution of government. Thus, it seems that 
opposition is a blurry political concept that is further weakened along Kircheimer’s (1957) 
reasoning by the decrease in partisan conflict that distinguishes government and opposition 
parties which was observed by Andeweg – De Winter  and Müller (2008) in relation to post-
consociational democracies. While this theory of the waning of political opposition can be 
critiqued  (see for example Loxbo-Sjölin, 2017), many studies point out that opposition 
behaviour is dependent on a complex set of factors including systemic and party specific 
features such as the need to differentiate themselves from the government (Tuttnauer, 2018), 
the government-types (Christiansen-Damgaard, 2008), the MPs’ socio-demographic 
background (Steinack, 2016), the bill specific features such as the ideological significance of 
the bill (Mújica-Sánches-Cuenca, 2006) and even regime-types (Franklin, 2002). 
 
Focusing on rules, there is a need to give a more exact definition of our understanding of the 
opposition. Following the conceptualization of Sieberer and Müller we can regard opposition 
as a minority in parliament which in terms of parliamentary processes emphasizes the role of 
minority rights: “Minority rights are particularly important as they distribute institutional 
power along the most important line of conflict within parliaments – the one between the 
governing majority and the opposition.” (Sieberer-Müller, 2015:998). This conceptualization 
is in line with how legislation, in our case the rules of parliamentary procedure, standardizes 
opposition as the application of “opposition tools” are often linked to a qualified minority (for 
example 1/5 of MPs can promote the establishment of a committee of inquiry). Clearly, this 
approach cannot capture the party level of opposition that can be useful in order to map 
resources for opposition activity (Kopecky-Spirova, 2008) but on the other hand are better fit 
to understand the dynamics of an unstable opposition arena such as the Hungarian case. 
 
In terms of legal procedures, “opposition tools” such as control tools are not conceptualized in 
terms of qualified minority but rather as the right of individual MPs. Both approaches to 
opposition’s rights - the qualified minority and the MP level – are open concepts in the way 
that being in opposition is a not a prerogative to possessing those given rights: government 
MPs can also ask interpellations to the government (which actually they often do) and a given 
group of government MPs can form a committee of inquiry to, say, evaluate the wrongdoings 
of a previous government. How do these levels interact then?  
 
The parliamentary level focuses on the institution itself. According to the Montesquieu’s 
doctrine of separation of powers, the role of the parliament is responsible for the legislation 
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and the control of the government. The capture of the parliament by the government which 
typically controls the majority of mandates imposes a threat on its autonomous functioning 
because it hinders the effective execution of these parliamentary functions. This idea is widely 
explored in the literature propagating the decline of parliaments (for a critical review, see 
Baldwin, 2004). Still, in order to approximate the doctrine of the separation of power, it is not 
the parliament in itself but rather a qualified minority that is enabled through constitutional 
and other legal warrants. As Smuk (2016) points out based on the case study of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court decision (2 BvE 4/14) the opposition is a political and not a legal 
phenomenon thus it is the minority and not the opposition that should be granted the rights to 
control the government. The puzzle of the German case was what happens if the opposition is 
smaller than the minority required for accessing those tools? The Court’s decision underlines 
that the separation of powers is based on the imperative of an effective opposition meaning 
that the opposition should have the necessary tools and measures to realize its parliamentary 
deliberative and control functions.  
 
The MP level focuses on the role of elected representatives in the parliamentary process. In 
legal terms, all MPs have the right to attend the parliamentary debates, to participate in the 
formulation of policies and to control the government. Thus, as I indicated above these are not 
“opposition rights” but rather MPs’ rights and MPs operate along a complex set of drivers of 
which one of the most important one is the need for reelection (Mayhew). Reelection is a 
complex game again since it depends on various agents such as their parties and their 
electorate. Their expectations can not always be derived from the opposition/government 
position even if it is about MPs’ activities on the parliamentary floor. As Proksch-Slapin 
(2015) demonstrate parties play an important role in allocating speaking time to their 
members and that speaking time is in high demand thus government parties not only hinder 
opposition MPs from speaking but also their own representatives. Thus, it is important to 
assess how MPs actually behave and what the do. Also MPs not only have rights assigned but 
also obligations that are often restrictive in terms of debate and control. In order to understand 
the MPs’ opportunity structure in its complexity, we should take into consideration how the 
government uses tools of disciplinary control on the floor.  
 
This complex set of rules and drivers calls for a complex approach to research:  
- first, the opposition’s structure of opportunity is examined to evaluate the array of 
tools available to the qualified minorities and MPs; 
- second the actual application of those tools is examined to see how the opposition 
goes about its “opposition business”. The analysis of the application of the tools 
available tells us how useful they are regarding the imperative of an effective 
opposition, if they are abused or not and whether they are used in line with the 
intended objectives or not; 
- third, the rules regarding disciplinary power should be examined to see what type of 
obligations there are and what are the sanctions to make MPs follow the lines, what 
are tools to curtail obstruction attempts; 
- fourth exogenous institutions should also be analysed in relation to the parliamentary 
game. In this aspect, Sieberer et al (2016) pointed out that showed reforms can be 
triggered by changes in the external environment of parliaments but my emphasis is 
that change in external factors is not a necessary requirement to look outside of the 
parliamentary arena in case there are external institutions that can act as veto-players 
(Tsebelis, 2002). The Constitutional Court appears to be a decisive actor in case of 
conflicts that are unresolvable within the parliamentary arena and also it is the 
institution addressed when legislative concerns emerge regarding the constitutionality 
of proposed legislations. Thus, the role of the Constitutional Court should be analysed 
along with the potential capture of the Court by the government that can hinder its 
potential to safeguard against the distortion of the parliamentary power structure. 
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Based on the theory of nested games (Tsebelis, 1990) that many researchers use to describe to 
complexity of the parliamentary game (Sieberer et al, 2011), I argue that the structure of 
opportunity of the opposition is not only determined by the parliamentary rules and 
procedures but by their use (as in how the opposition can profit form the available resources) 
and application (as in how the government can apply the rules to limit these opportunities) 
and the strategy developed by each actor does not only depend on endogenous factors (such 
as the parliamentary rules) but on exogenous factors such as the role of veto-players (as in 
their legal status and political potential to override procedural decisions).  
 
 
3. The changing opportunity structure of the opposition in Hungary 
 
In order to capture the most important elements of the opportunity structure of the opposition 
as well as its potential dynamic of change, Garriztmann proposes an encompassing index that 
attempts to quantify and measure the degree of freedom of the opposition that I will use as a 
starting point for the analyses of the Hungarian case. The index reflects on the basic functions 
of the opposition – control and the (re)presentation of political alternatives - including 
measures of the strength of committees, oral questions, written questions, parliamentary 
question time and an agenda setting index. Many of these dimensions have been thoroughly 
explored in previous publications (Ilonszki-Jáger,2011, Ilonszki-Várnagy, 2018), but the 
reform parliamentary procedures and the enactment of the Act on the National Assembly in 
2012 along with their amendments since then makes the revision of changes necessary. 
Moreover, I will address some additional dimensions that are missing from this framework 
mainly the disciplinary powers and the role of exogenous actors. As a result of the nested 
game approach, I will treat deviant parliamentary outcomes such as the attempts at 
obstruction and obstruction as a strategy developed in response to the above described 
framework.3  
 
3.1.Control functions 
 
The traditional monitoring tools are interpellations, prompt questions and oral questions used 
by Members in a plenary sitting. Out of these three, interpellations are the most important as 
the representatives vote on the response given and if the Parliament rejects the response a 
committee report is drawn up an submitted for debate at a plenary session. As figure 1 depicts 
the use of these tools have not followed a clear pattern in the previous cycles and while we 
can witness an increase in the number of oral questions presented on the floor, it cannot be 
explained through the change of parliamentary rules as it did not modify the rules of the 
questions. 
 
                                               
3 Garritzmann also addresses obstruction but only in relation to the agenda-setting powers, while all types of 
obstruction (such as attempts to dissolve the parlaimentary meetings or to hinder final voting) will be considered 
in this paper. 
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Source: Website of the Hungarian Assembly, www.parlament.hu 
 
Members of Parliament can also take the in speeches before and after the orders of the day 
with the former being broadcasted by radio and television. Regarding the trends, we can 
conclude that in the 2014-18 parliamentary cycle, the speeches after the orders of the day 
become more popular among MPs. The increase can be attributed to the fact that the access to 
the plenary become more limited after 2012 and also that independent MPs can also use this 
form of communication while speeches before the orders of the day can only be tabled by 
members of PPGs.  
 
  
Source: Website of the Hungarian Assembly, www.parlament.hu 
 
Committees of inquiry can also be formed by the Parliament following a motion tabled by one 
fifth of the MPs. While before 2012 such proposals were automatically accepted, the new 
regulation introduces a new requirement stating that committees of inquiry can only be 
formed in case the given case can not be sufficiently explored through interpellation and that 
the plenary vote on the proposal is needed for the establishment of the committee. The change 
had a clear effect on the formation of such committees as none were formed during the last 
parliamentary cycle despite of the relatively high number of proposals submitted. Based on 
the data presented in table 1, it is important to note that despite of not needing a plenary vote 
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Figure 1: Use of control tools
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on the proposal, the establishment of committees of inquiry was often sabotaged during the 
process even before 2012: in many instances the proposal on the establishment was not 
tabled, or the committee was not able to form due to the absence of its members or the 
plenary failed to accept the report suggested by the committee.  
 
Table 1: The proposals to establish a committee of inquiry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Magyar, 2018 
 
Another tool is the initiation of policy debates: based on a motion submitted by one-fifth of 
the MPs, the Parliament holds a policy debate on the policy topic identified in the motion. 
Table 2 indicates that there is a growing popularity of the debates which is partly explained by 
the lack of committees of inquiry and the limited access to the plenary floor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Initiator Proposal Establishment Formation Report   
19
90
-1
99
4 Government 
MPs 11 0 0 0 
Opposition MPs 13 1 1 0 
Total 24 1 1 0 
19
94
–1
99
8 Government 
MPs 2 1 1 0 
Opposition MPs 25 6 5 3 
Total 27 7 6 3 
19
98
–2
00
2 Government 
MPs 8 4 4 1 
Opposition MPs 16 2 0 0 
Total 24 6 4 1 
20
02
–2
00
6 Government MPs 8 5 3 0 
Opposition MPs 20 9 9 1 
Committee 1 1 1 0 
Total 29 15 13 1 
20
06
–2
01
0 Government 
MPs 3 2 0 0 
Opposition MPs 14 6 1 0 
Total 17 8 1 0 
20
10
-2
01
4 Government 
MPs 6 5 5 4 
Opposition MPs 16 2 1 1 
Total 22 7 6 5 
20
14
-2
01
8 Government 
MPs  0  0 0  0 
Opposition MPs  23  0 0 0 
Total  23 0  0 0  
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Table 2: Policy debates submitted broken down by submitter 
 
To sum up we can observe a certain shift in the use of control tools in the Hungarian 
Parliament: while the use of the various type of questions has not changed much, the 
requirement of a plenary vote basically killed of the committees of inquiry which prompted 
MPs to turn towards other resources of floor time such as speeches outside the orders of the 
day and policy debates. 
 
3.2.Legislation and debate 
 
The legislative process of the Hungarian National Assembly underwent major changes 
according to the Law on the National Assembly. Figure 3 depicts the current legislative 
process which is different from the former process in three ways: first, the scope of bills 
requiring a qualified majority of two thirds of MPs was modified. While the increase in the 
number of supermajority bills points to the importance of cooperation with the parliamentary 
minority, the fact that since 2010 the minority was only strong enough to block the legislation 
of 2/3 bills for three years between 2015 – 2018 suggests that the governing parties are not 
always limited by this institution and if allowed they can even abuse their power without 
taking into consideration the constitutional ideal of effective opposition. 
 
The second critical change introduced is the shift of the detailed debate from the plenary 
session to the so-called “designated committees” that are assigned to each bill by the House 
Speaker. Thus, after a general debate which usually consist of the introduction of the policy 
and main guidelines of the legislation, the meticulous work of dissecting the proposal partly 
along the emerging policy alternatives and partly along the introduced amendments takes 
place in committees. In this phase the committees make also decision about the introduced 
amendments. While it could strengthen the role of committees in the decision-making process 
and enable MPs to contribute to the debate without the added pressure of the media and public 
attention paid. to plenaries, the data on the total number of committee meetings an the amount 
of time spent in committee meetings actually decreased from 2010-2014 to 2014-2018 by 
almost 45-50% (Országgyűlés Hivatala, 2018). This decrease along with the growing 
responsibility of committees rather suggests that the work of committees became even more 
simplified supposedly by the widespread use of political voting without meaningful debate.  
 
The third major change was introduced to the process following the committee phase. A new 
committee, a Committee on Legislation was founded that enjoys a high political status since it 
reviews the amendments adopted in committees, its own amendments and combines the 
original bill and the modifications into a single proposal. This single proposal called the 
summary of proposed amendments is to be discussed on the plenary floor. It means that most 
of the amendments won’t reach the plenary floor by themselves, only if they were 
successfully integrated in the single proposal. While the MPs can request the debate of a 
certain amendment on the floor, the parliamentary bottleneck prompts the actors to only 
revise the viable proposal and not waste time on amendments that are not supported by the 
committees thus by the government. This shift towards the revision of the viable document 
Submitter 
1990-
1994 
1994-
1998 
1998-
2002 
2002-
2006 
2006-
2010 
2010-
2014 
2014-
2018 
Government 3 1 2 0 3 0 4 
Governmental parties 0 2 2 5 2 4 1 
Opposition parties 2 10 11 22 5 6 17 
Total 5 13 14 27 9 10 22 
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(along with the committee reports though) weakens the potential of presenting, revising and 
debating alternatives and diverting policy ideas.  
 
Also the presentation of a single proposal, the summary of proposed amendments can change 
the dynamics of voting – while MPs had the chance to express their detailed opinion through 
the vote on amendments before, now the stakes of expressing opposition are higher not 
because it threatens the vote on the bill but rather because the discontent MP can only refuse 
the bill as a whole. In case of popular decisions, this routine makes it hard to express nuanced 
critics (such as “I like the idea but not the realization”). Also it is hard to differentiate between 
the acceptance and the rejection of certain amendments as voting is done en bloc, about all of 
them. It is even more problematic if we take into consideration that the Committee on 
Legislation can propose an amendment to the bill three hours before the opening of the sitting 
when the final vote is scheduled leaving very limited time for MPs (and their experts) to 
revise the new, modified proposal. 
 
While time as a scarce resource is the explanatory factor behind many parliamentary reforms, 
its use is also the most criticised aspect of the reform as the legislative process seems to have 
gathered speed leaving very limited time window for debate. In the Hungarian National 
Assembly there are three types of special procedures that can accelerate the legislation 
process: 
- The proposal of urgency can be submitted by at least twenty- five MPs and can be 
applied no more than six times in half-year. By adopting the proposal the time frame 
between the day of ordering and the final vote on the legislative proposal can be 
shortened to six days.  
- The proposal for exceptional proceeding requires the supporting signatures of at least 
one-fifth of the Members and can be applied four times in half a year. The deadline for   
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Figure 3: The legislative process of the Hungarian National Assembly   
A legislative proposal is submitted. 
Legislative proposals may be submitted by the President of the Republic, the Government, 
parliamentary committees and MPs (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §31). 
 
The Speaker designates a committee to hold a detailed debate on the proposal (hereinafter 
known as the designated committee) (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §32 (1)). 
A general plenary debate is held (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §34). 
 
A detailed debate is held in the designated and co-operating committees (hereinafter known 
as the reading committees). During the debate, committees vote on proposed amendments, 
support them, uphold them with changes or may formulate additional planned amendments. 
(Parl. Res. 10/2014, §43-44). 
The reading committee adopts an amendment which closes the detailed debate and submits it to 
the Speaker with its final report on the detailed debate (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §45) 
Parliament upholds amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, 
§48(6)). 
The Committee on Legislation sends the Speaker the combined language of the legislative 
proposal and the summary of proposed amendments (herein-after known as the unified proposal) 
signed by the proposer (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §46(10)). 
The Committee on Legislation forms an opinion on the amendments adopted in committee with 
the close of the detailed debate. It combines the amendments adopted in committee with the close 
of the detailed debate and its own proposals into a single proposal (hereinafter known as the 
summary of proposed amendments). It sends the Speaker a report on the close of the reading and 
on the contents of the summary of proposed amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §46). 
A plenary debate is held on the committee reports regarding the detailed debate, on the summary 
report and on the summary of proposed amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §47). 
The Committee on Legislation submits a second summary 
of proposed amendments (the combined language of the 
summary of proposed amendments and the upheld 
proposed amendment) and a second unified proposal (the 
combined language of the legislative proposal and the 
second summary of proposed amendments) (Parl. Res. 
10/2014, §48(7)). 
Parliament decides on the second summary of proposed 
amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §49(2)). 
Parliament does not uphold amendments (Parl. Res. 
10/2014, §48(6)). 
A non-designated committee (hereinafter known 
as the co-operating committee) may submit a 
request to the Speaker to join in the debate of any 
provisions of the legislative proposal that fall 
within its scope (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §32(2)). 
Parliament decides on the summary of proposed 
amendments (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §48(1)). 
Final vote (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §50) 
Before a proposer may request a 
postponement of the vote if they 
wish to submit a proposed 
amendment in preparation for the 
vote. 
final 
vote, 
The proposer explains his/her position on the 
amendments proposed in committee (Parl. Res. 
10/2014, §46(1)). 
Proposed amendments may be submitted by 
MPs. /excepting the proposer to his/her own 
motion/ (Parl. Res. 10/2014, §40(1)). 
Source: www.parlament.hu 
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- submitting the proposals for amendment shall not be less than three hours after the 
decision ordering the exceptional procedure 
- Upon the proposal of the House Committee, the National Assembly may decide, to 
derogate from the provisions of the Rules of Procedure with the votes of at least the 
four-fifth of the Members present. This derogation can affect either the course of the 
discussion of and/or the decision-making on specific matters. 
The resulting quickening in the legislation process and its consequences have been discussed 
in earlier work (Ilonszki-Várnagy, 2018) while its consequences regarding the quality of the 
political debate and the ensuing quality decision-making is to be explored further (see the 
report of the Corruption Research Center Budapest, 2015 for an early attempt). 
 
Following the reasoning of Szente (2018), we can relate the problem not only to the 
opposition but to the government MPs as well. On the one hand, plenary time becomes an 
even more scarce resource among governmental benches. On the other hand, the growing 
number of bills introduced by government MPs suggest that political debate is avoided not 
only in relation to the opposition but also in relation to its own politicians. These routines chip 
away from the right to debate of all MPs in the Parliament. The lack of enough time to debate 
bills is not a Hungarian phenomena, in her expert review of arrangements for allocating time 
to proceedings on bills, Newson (2017) concludes that the time spent on scrutinising a bill 
should be increased. This question clearly touches upon the issue of efficient changes and 
redistributive changes (Tsebelis, 1990). As Sieberer and Müller state: “The process and 
outcome of institutional reforms depend on the question whether actors are affected equally 
by institutional changes. […] Efficient reforms benefit all actors involved in the reform 
process irrespective of their position in political competition (e.g. their government status or 
their position in the party hierarchy). Distributive reforms, on the other hand, strengthen some 
actors at the expense of others – i.e. actors are affected differently depending on their position 
in political competition.” (Sieberer-Müller, 2015). The overview of the changes in the 
legislative process suggest that while these reforms clearly helped to address the 
parliamentary bottleneck, the need for such frantic legislation can itself be questioned and the 
redistributive nature of the reform is undeniable.  
 
4. The changes in the disciplinary power of the Parliament 
 
One of the main changes in the legislation concerning parliamentary work was the 
strengthening of the disciplinary powers that are mainly practised by the Speaker of the 
House. According to the new rules, the functions of the disciplinary power is to secure the 
undisturbed proceeding of the sittings, to safeguard the reputation of the National Assembly 
and the chair and to safeguard the measures taken by the Speaker. One of the main drivers 
behind the change was to hinder obstruction and also to enable to Speaker to deal with the 
new methods of communication occurring in the Hungarian Parliament such as the use of 
megaphones, banners and such. This phenomenon is not exclusively Hungarian: Bell (2017) 
notes that the introduction of large numbers of amendments or sub-amendments appears to be 
a prevalent obstructionist tactic. Also the Slovak Parliament has recently passed a reform of 
the parliamentary proceedings with very similar triggers and elements to the ones of the 
Hungarian reform. As Melles (2017) documents after the 2010 Slovakian elections, a new 
style of debate was introduced to the floor with Igor Matovic, member of the Ordinary People 
faction who repeatedly used banners and other visual tools to emphasize its arguments. As a 
result, the use of alternative visuals became prohibited in the Slovak Parliament similarly to 
the Hungarian Assembly.    
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Table 3: Disciplinary measures in the Hungarian Parliament 
 
MPs activity Decision 1 Decision 2 Decision 3 Legal Consequence Legal remedy 
The MP deters from the 
subject of the speech in a 
clearly unreasonable 
manner. 
First warning to focus 
on the given topic 
Second warning to focus 
on the given topic 
Withdraw the right 
to speak 
The MP can not have the floor again 
on the same sitting day, in the course 
of discussing the same item on the 
orders of the day. 
 
The MP used up all the 
timeframe available for 
him/her or for his/her 
parliamentary group. 
Withdraw the right to 
speak (giving the cause 
of the withdrawal) 
       
The MP uses an indecent 
term or a term offending the 
reputation of the National 
Assembly or any person or 
group. 
Reprimand the MP In case of repetition, 
withdraw the right to 
speak 
  The MP can not have the floor again 
on the same sitting day, in the course 
of discussing the same item on the 
orders of the day. 
 
The MP uses a term 
ostentatiously offending the 
reputation of the National 
Assembly or any person or 
group 
Exclusion of the MP 
without warning 
The National Assembly 
takes vote without 
debate on the proposal 
for exclusion 
If the National 
Assembly has no 
quorum, the chair 
of the sitting shall 
decide on the 
exclusion. 
The Member excluded from the sitting 
day shall not have the floor again on 
the same sitting day.  
The Member excluded from the sitting 
day shall not be entitled to 
remuneration for the day of exclusion. 
At the next sitting of the 
National Assembly the chair of 
the sitting shall inform the 
National Assembly of the 
exclusion and its reason. Then 
the National Assembly shall 
decide without debate on the 
lawfulness of the decision 
taken by the chair of the sitting. 
The MP objects to the 
decision or the conducting 
of the sitting by the chair 
(except for  making a 
procedural proposal) 
Witdraw the right to 
speak without warning 
    The MP shall not have the floor again 
on the same sitting day, in the course 
of discussing the same item on the 
orders of the day. 
The MP, whose right to speak 
has been withdrawn without 
calling and warning, the 
committee responsible for the 
interpretation of the provisions 
of the Rules of Procedure to 
take an ad hoc position. 
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The MP seriously violates 
the reputation or the order 
of the National Assembly, 
or infringes by his or her 
conduct the provisions of 
the Rules of Procedure.. 
reprimand the MP and 
give a warning of 
exclusion 
Exclusion of the MP for 
the remaining part of the 
sitting day. 
The remuneration 
payable to the Member 
may be decreased 
  The MPS excluded from the sitting 
day shall not have the floor again on 
the same sitting day.  
The Member excluded from the sitting 
day shall not be entitled to 
remuneration for the day of exclusion. 
The Parliamentary Guard shall be in 
charge of the enforcement of this 
prohibition 
At the next sitting of the 
National Assembly the chair of 
the sitting shall inform the 
National Assembly of the 
exclusion and its reason. Then 
the National Assembly shall 
decide without debate on the 
lawfulness of the decision 
taken by the chair of the sitting. 
The MP exerts physical 
violence at the sitting of the 
National Assembly, 
threatened with or called 
for direct physical violence, 
or hindered the taking out 
of another person.  
Exclusion of the MP 
from the sitting day.  
The emuneration 
payable to the Member 
may be decreased  
The National Assembly 
takes vote without 
debate on the proposal 
for exclusion 
If the National 
Assembly has no 
quorum, the chair 
of the sitting shall 
decide on the 
exclusion.  
The MP excluded from the sitting day 
shall not have the floor again on the 
same sitting day.  
The MP excluded from the sitting day 
shall not be entitled to remuneration 
for the day of exclusion. 
The Parliamentary Guard shall be in 
charge of the enforcement of this 
prohibition. 
At the next sitting of the 
National Assembly the chair of 
the sitting shall inform the 
National Assembly of the 
exclusion and its reason. Then 
the National Assembly shall 
decide without debate on the 
lawfulness of the decision 
taken by the chair of the sitting. 
Suspension of the 
exercising of the 
Member’s rights in case 
of repeated conduct. 
    The MP shall not attend the sittings of 
the National Assembly, shall not 
participate in the work of the 
parliamentary committees and shall 
not receive remuneration.  
The Parliamentary Guard shall be in 
charge of the enforcement of this 
prohibition. 
The MP against whom a 
policing measure has been 
applied by the chair of the 
sitting may submit an objection 
to the committee on immunity, 
incompatibility, discipline and 
mandate 
In case of disturbance 
taking place at the sitting of 
the National Assembly of 
such extent that makes the 
continuation of the 
discussion impossible  
The sitting may 
suspended for a definite 
period or may be closed 
by the chair of the 
sitting. 
If the chair of the sitting 
is unable to announce 
his or her decision, he or 
she shall leave the chair 
and the sitting shall be 
interrupted.  
If the sitting has been 
interrupted, the sitting 
shall only continue upon 
the Speaker convening it 
again.  
    The MP may request that the 
Committee on Immunity, 
Conflict of Interest, Discipline 
and Mandate Control rescind a 
decision. 
Source: The website of the Hungarian parliament, www.parlament.hu
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Table 3 presents the arsenal of disciplinary tools available to the Hungarian Parliament most 
of which can be applied by the Speaker. Based on the new legislation we can observe a 
growing disciplinary trend: in the 2010-2014 cycle there were 15 votes on proposals to 
decrease the remuneration of MPs (affecting 40 MPs in total) , in 2014-2018 there were 22 
while in the current parliamentary cycle (2018-2022) there have already been 45 such 
proposals.   
This shift from debate to discipline is clearly problematic. While the causes and consequences 
are hard to distinguish namely if it is the government that wishes to silence further the 
opposition or if it is the new communication style that prompted the changes to guard the 
reputation of the Parliament, the outcome is clear: one person, the Speaker of the House can 
decide on what s/he deems acceptable and suitable for parliamentary debate. If we consider 
that at the time of the reform tools to question these decisions were not available, we can 
clearly see the redistributive nature of the reform. Although, on 13 February 2014 the 
Parliament passed an amendment to the Parliament Act, modifying the rules of disciplinary 
procedure for MPs introducing the possibility for a fined MP to seek a remedy before a 
committee, it does not solve our original concern about who is entitled to overrule 
representatives in the House.  
 
5. The role of the Constitutional Court 
 
The Constitutional Court has the potential of becoming a veto-player in the parliamentary 
process in many aspects. First and foremost, the Court can intervene in the legislation process 
through the constitutional review of the legislation. In this dimension we can observe the 
increase of minority rights in the Hungarian Parliament as before the reform of the 
Constitutional Court only the Speaker of the House could initiate such review, while now one 
fifth of the MPs can ask for a constitutional review. Through the review the Constitutional 
Court potentially has the power to review the reform of the Law on the National Assembly as 
well, thus can act as a veto-player in the legislative process. During the reform of the 
parliamentary procedures, a debate has taken place about the potential role of the 
Constitutional Court in reviewing the procedural decisions made by the National Assembly. 
The idea was that the Court could act as an exogenous institution where MPs can turn to for 
legal remedy (Szabó, 2017) but it was rejected.  
The case-law also suggest the reluctance of the Constitutional Court to interfere directly with 
the procedural workings of the Parliament. In the spring parliamentary session of 2013 several 
politicians of the opposition used visual materials, banners and placards displaying critic of 
the government in parliamentary sessions. One of the placards read “Here Operates the 
National Tobacco Mafia”. Subsequently, the Speaker of the House fined all of the MPs 
involved who in turn decided to submit a complaint to the Hungarian Supreme Court which 
ruled against them stating that while the Parliamentary Act (at that time) did not provide for a 
remedy against disciplinary decision, remedy is only necessary if the decision is made by a 
judicial organ, State administration or an administrative authority. Since disciplinary 
decisions of Parliament did not fall into any of the above categories, the lack of a remedy 
against them was not unconstitutional in itself (Constitutional Court judgment no. 3206/2013 
(XI.18) AB of 4 November 2013). It is worth to note that the opposition MPs also appellead 
to the European Court of Human Rights (Applications nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13) that ruled 
partly in their favor (Judgment 17 May 2016) and in its first decision pointed out the lack of 
legal remedy as a problem which was solved an amendment in 2014 that introduced a legal 
remedy.  
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In order to fully grasp the potential of the Constitutional Court in exercising control over the 
parliamentary decisions we have to recall that with the constitutional amendments of 2010 
and 2011 the government raised the number of judges to 15 along with dominating the 
nomination of the  judges to the Constitutional Court, limited the powers of the Court and put 
the election of the president of the Court in the hand of the parliament. While the Court is still 
capable of addressing sensitive political issues (Stumpf, 2017), its potential for acting as a 
veto-player in the political sense can be questioned.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The overview of the reform of the rules of the parliamentary game and its changes after 2012 
depicts a rather strict picture of the parliament where it seems, the interference of the 
oppositions is rather seen as an inconvenience and brother to the smooth business of 
legislation. While in table 4 we can observe changes that have a minority-friendly aspect such 
as the wider range of appointments by qualified majority, the fact that the government has 
enjoyed supermajority for all but 3 years since 2010 modifies our understanding of current 
affairs. Still most of the introduced changes are rather majority-friendly and enable the 
majority to dominate the parliamentary process. 
The problematic nature of opposition has been pointed out by various case-studies (De 
Giorgi-Ilonszki, 2018) but my analysis brings to light one yet understudied aspect of the 
institutional framework: the disciplinary tools. These tools are important because they affect 
MPs as individuals and thus their effect is direct (while the effect of the increase of qualified 
minority rule is indirect). They also shift the opposition-government dynamic, influence the 
nature of their conflict towards value-based evaluations and assessments. In case we 
conceptualize the opposition as MPs or group of MPs whose role is to control the 
government, the adequate answer is not discipline but accountability. Of course, in this shift it 
is not only the government who is to blame, since the opposition is clearly changing its 
communication and often attempts to use the plenary floor as a theatre stage where conflict 
and spectacle sell. But the narrowing of the structure of opportunities will hardly change 
political culture for the better, instead it will prompt further conflict which will soon be 
undebatable in their nature thus truly unfit for the parliamentary floor.  
  
 
Table 4: Changes in the structure of opposition opportunities after 2012 
Tools available to 
opposition 
Current conditions and/or 
requirements of 
application 
Description of change 
Legislation requiring 
qualified majority (2/3) 
Defined by the Fundamental 
Law 
Wider range of legislation 
Detailed debate on bills Takes place in committees Shifted from plenary to 
committee floor 
Vote on amendments Takes place in plenaries Takes place in committees 
Appointment of the 
Members of the 
Constitutional Court 
Ad hoc parliamentary 
committee composed of 
representatives of all 
parliamentary parties 
reflecting the parliamentary 
strength of the 
parties 
Abolishment of parity in the 
committee 
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Appointments by qualified 
majority (2/3) 
Ombdusman, president of 
the State Audit Office, 
member and president of the 
Constitutional Court, 
president of the Curia, 
public Prosecutor 
Wider range of 
appointments  
Procedural decisions by 
qualified majority 
- exceptional proceeding 
(4/5) 
- urgent proceedings 
- derogation from the 
provisions of the Rules of 
Procedure (4/5) 
Limited use of non-ordinary 
procedures but wider use of 
derogations 
Constitutional review of 
legislation 
¼ of MPs can request post 
facto constitutional review 
Abolishment of the actio 
popularis but constitutional 
review made available to 
MPs 
Committee 1/5 of MPs can propose the 
establishment of an 
investigative committee 
MPs only have the right to 
propose, the decision is 
made by the plenary  
Referendum initiative Not available to MPs Abolishment of MPs right to 
initiate a referendum 
Source: modified from Smuk, 2012:27 
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